International Taxation and FDI Strategies: Evidence From US Cross-Border Acquisitions by Nils Herger et al.
Economics Department 
Discussion Papers Series 
ISSN 1473 – 3307 
 
International Taxation and FDI Strategies: 








Paper number 11/09 
URL: http://business-school.exeter.ac.uk/economics/papers/ 
URL Repec page: http://ideas.repec.org/s/fth/exetec.html  INTERNATIONAL TAXATION AND FDI STRATEGIES: EVIDENCE FROM US
CROSS BORDER ACQUISITIONS
by
Nils Herger†, Christos Kotsogiannis‡ a and Steve McCorriston‡
First version: January, 2010
This version: June 20, 2011
Abstract: While there is a well established body of empirical research documenting the
negative eﬀect of taxation on foreign direct investment (FDI), there is scant evidence on
the extent to which international tax considerations (double taxation, international tax
relief stipulated in bilateral tax treaties and the eﬀect of withholding taxes) aﬀect the role
of taxation for FDI, and how tax issues diﬀer according to the investment strategies—
‘horizontal’ and ‘vertical’—pursued by multinational ﬁrms. This paper addresses these
issues. Using data on US acquisitions over the period 1995 2005 in 18 OECD countries,
it is shown that international tax relief plays a critical role in determining the impact of
taxation. Regardless of the type of investment strategy, the signiﬁcantly negative eﬀect of
corporate taxes disappears when accounting for the tax credits stipulated in bilateral tax
treaties. It is also shown that there is considerable heterogeneity of the impact of sales
taxes across investment strategies. High administrative burden to comply with taxation
always reduces a country’s appeal as target for FDI.
JEL classiﬁcation: F15, F21, F23, F33
Keywords: Corporate taxation; Cross-Border acquisitions; FDI strategies; Tax treaties; Tax cred-
its
Acknowledgements: We thank Mick Keen, Alexander Klemm, James Markusen and Yoto
Yotov for comments and advice on an earlier version of this paper and seminar participants
at the International Monetary Fund, the 2010 SSES Conference, and the 2010 ETSG for
comments. The usual caveat applies.
†Study Center Gerzensee, Dorfstrasse 2, P.O. Box 21, 3115 Gerzensee, Switzerland. E 
mail: nils.herger@szgerzensee.ch
‡Department of Economics, University of Exeter Business School, Streatham Court, Rennes
Drive, Exeter EX4 4PU, England, UK. E mail: c.kotsogiannis@exeter.ac.uk (Kotsogian 
nis), s.mccorriston@exeter.ac.uk (McCorriston).
aCESIfo, Munich, Germany.1 Introduction
Though there is a broadly shared view that taxes reduce the desire of multinational ﬁrms
to undertake foreign direct investment (FDI), there is substantial variation in the estimates
of the corresponding tax elasticities. For example, for taxes levied directly on corporate
proﬁts, elasticities between 0 to  5 percent have been found (see De Mooij and Ederveen
(2003) for an overview). Such variation reﬂects diﬀerences in measuring the tax burden on
the multinational ﬁrm including the distinction between statutory and eﬀective tax rates
(see, among others, Devereux et al., 2002) or diﬀerent forms of investment (Auerbach and
Hassett (1993), Swenson (2001), and Mutti and Grubert (2004)). Further issues on the
impact of taxes on FDI relate to the role of indirect (non proﬁt) taxes such as sales or
labor taxes (Desai and Hines, 2004) and the overall complexity of the tax system (Djankov
et al., 2010). This paper contributes to the empirical literature on FDI and taxation by
considering two issues that have, surprisingly, received limited attention in the literature:
Firstly, is the treatment of income (for tax purposes) earned by multinational ﬁrms in the
foreign (in the form of international tax relief stipulated in bilateral tax treaties and the
eﬀect of withholding taxes when multinational ﬁrms want to locate economic activities
abroad) and, secondly, and perhaps more importantly, is the explicit recognition that
diﬀerent investment strategies motivate multinational integration.
Regarding the latter issue, the existing literature (explicitly or implicitly) restricts at 
tention to horizontal FDI; see, for example, Devereux and Griﬃth (1998), Behrens and
Picard (2008), and Davies et al. (2007). Notable exception to this is the contribution of
Mutti and Grubert (2004) who recognize that taxation might have a diﬀerential impact on
FDI depending on whether the investment is embedded in a ‘horizontal’ strategy (mean 
ing that the multinational ﬁrms seek market access by replicating production facilities
abroad) or a ‘vertical’ strategy (in the sense of fragmenting the supply chain to outsource
production stages abroad). While this distinction is often assumed to be related to FDI
between developed countries (typically horizontal FDI) and between developed and de 
veloping countries (vertical FDI), Alfaro and Charlton (2009) have shown that a large
part of vertical FDI typically arises between developed countries. We also observe this in
the data used in this paper. As regards taxation, the important aspect of distinguishing
between diﬀerent FDI strategies is that the motives for establishing a subsidiary plant
diﬀer; by extension, the role of taxes may also diﬀer. For example, since the motive for
horizontal FDI is to sell goods locally, sales taxes might matter. Conversely, vertical FDI
is motivated by the desire to access certain factor endowments to lower the production
cost of a ﬁnal good that is typically sold elsewhere. Local sales taxes are less likely to
matter in this case.
1Our results have been estimated with data on cross border acquisitions (CBAs) by US
ﬁrms for the 1995 2005 period (CBAs are the dominant form to integrate foreign sub 
sidiaries and account for around 90 percent of FDI between developed countries).1 The
identiﬁcation of horizontal and vertical deals requires dis aggregated data of the indus 
try segments of US ﬁrms involved as acquirer and the corresponding industry segments
of the target ﬁrms abroad. We subsequently match these acquirer and target industry
segments with a measure of vertical relatedness arising from US input:output tables to
identify whether or not the ﬁrms involved in an acquisition are connected through the
supply chain. Separating horizontal from vertical strategies allows us to address whether
taxation across alternative location choices has a diﬀerential impact across these alterna 
tive strategies. Within our sample, we show indeed that (a) US FDI to 18 other OECD
countries involves a mix of both horizontal and vertical strategies, and (b) the eﬀect of
taxation has a substantially diﬀerential impact on the two alternative FDI strategies.
It is shown that, in line with previous results, corporate taxation measured in terms
of statutory or eﬀective average rates deters US acquisitions in a signiﬁcant manner.
Corporate proﬁt taxes in the host country, however, are shown not to signiﬁcantly deter
CBAs when accounting for the international tax relief stipulated in the bilateral treaties
with the 18 host countries in our sample. Other tax dimensions matter: sales taxes and
the overall administrative burden of conforming to tax procedures do have a signiﬁcantly
negative eﬀect on the decision to take over ﬁrms in speciﬁc countries, though labor taxes
do not. Notably, a diﬀerential eﬀect arises with sales taxes in the sense that they matter
for horizontal, but not for vertical FDI, a result that can be attributed to the fact that
when vertically integrated plants produce intermediate goods that are exported, they are
exempted from local sales taxes.
To estimate the degree with which taxation aﬀects the desire of US ﬁrms to acquire a
foreign subsidiary, our econometric strategy involves the use of Poisson count and condi 
tional logit regressions. While the conditional logit models and Poisson count regressions
yield identical coeﬃcient estimates (Guimaraes et al., 2003), the corresponding elasticities
diﬀer (Schmidheiny and Br  ulhart, 2011). One of the advantages of the conditional logit
estimates is that we can derive tax elasticities by host country. Against this background,
we ﬁnd direct tax elasticities slightly below  1 percent when using statutory tax rates and
even lower values of around  0.5 percent with eﬀective average tax rates. The host country
speciﬁc elasticities indicate variation across countries, with the highest tax elasticities to
1Recent studies on the impact of corporate taxes have focussed on CBAs. Becker and Fuest (2008,
2010) look at the theoretical aspects of the distinction between greenﬁeld FDI and international acquisi-
tions. Tying with the above observation that treatment of double taxation matters, Huizinga and Voget
(2009a) show that accounting for double taxation is an important empirical determinant of CBAs.
2attract US CBAs accruing to Canada, Germany, France and the UK. With reference to
indirect taxes, sales taxes have an elasticity of around  0.15 percent, whilst the elasticity
of the administrative tax burden is around  0.5 percent. While there is little diﬀerence in
the tax elasticities contingent on horizontal or vertical CBAs, the sales tax elasticity is
conﬁned to deterring horizontal but not vertical FDI.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides more details on the literature on
which this paper builds. Section 3 addresses issues regarding the relevant tax measure
for the multinational ﬁrm accounting for the role of bilateral tax treaties and tax cred 
its. Section 4 outlines the methodology for identifying alternative motives for foreign
acquisitions highlighting the distinction between horizontal and vertical FDI strategies.
Section 5 presents the econometric framework and addresses issues relating to the control
variables determining a ﬁrm’s decision to acquire aﬃliates in foreign countries. Section 6
reports the results and Section 7 concludes.
2 Related literature
Despite of the growth of FDI over recent decades, there is only a small literature con 
sidering the eﬀect of taxing the same income in diﬀerent countries and the degree with
which bilateral treaties oﬀer relief from such double taxation. For the US, Blonigen and
Davis (2004) suggest that FDI is signiﬁcantly higher when foreign countries have a double
income tax treaty. More recently, Huizinga and Voget (2009a) consider the diﬀerences
between countries applying a worldwide and an exemption based tax system to calculate
the double tax rate and the role of withholding tax rates agreed in tax treaties; they ﬁnd
that this reduces the likelihood of parent ﬁrm location in a given country. Though our
methodology to calculate tax rates on foreign income earned by the multinational ﬁrm (see
Section 3) will be similar to that of Huizinga and Voget (2009a), we focus more directly
on the potential eﬀects of international tax treatment on the estimated tax elasticities.
The econometric strategy also allows us to derive these eﬀects by host country.
The literature on FDI assigns typically two motives for ﬁrms controlling a subsidiary
abroad: horizontal FDI, whereby ﬁrms seek to access markets by replicating produc 
tion facilities overseas, and vertical FDI, whereby ﬁrms fragment the production process.
Markusen (2002) provides a comprehensive account of this and embeds the horizontal and
vertical investment strategies in a uniﬁed framework. Reﬂecting the diﬀerent motives, hor 
izontal and vertical FDI should emerge, respectively, between developed and developing
countries.2 Some doubt concerning the dominance of horizontal FDI between developed
2There is a parallel literature on FDI ﬂows that aims to test in an indirect manner whether FDI is
3countries has been recently raised by Alfaro and Charlton (2009). Their main contribution
is to directly measure vertical relatedness between aﬃliate activity and the parent com 
pany. They show that a large part of FDI between developed countries is actually vertical
in nature with a large proportion of this being intra industry (e.g. within broad industry
aggregates). To question the assumption that FDI ﬂows between developed countries are
principally horizontal in nature, the crucial aspect is the identiﬁcation of vertical related 
ness from the value ﬂows within supply chains as reported in input:output tables. In the
determination of acquisition strategies outlined in Section 4, our methodology is similar
to that of Alfaro and Charlton (2009).
As noted above, regarding the eﬀect of taxation on FDI, the only paper that has ex 
plicitly addressed the horizontal/vertical distinction is by Mutti and Grubert (2004) who
argue, and conﬁrm with empirical evidence, that the eﬀect of direct corporate taxes will
be asymmetric and contingent on the underlying investment strategy. In particular, they
conjecture that taxes will have no eﬀect on horizontal FDI, since the corresponding aﬃl 
iates will be on the same footing as domestic ﬁrms in the host country. Conversely, high
taxes on vertical FDI will place a subsidiary at a disadvantage, since it will be competing
with ﬁrms in the source country that have not invested abroad. However, apart from the
lack of account for other features of taxes and the treatment of tax credits, Mutti and
Grubert (2004) also have no direct measure of vertical FDI. Still, the main merit of the
Mutti and Grubert paper is to tie with the focus of the international economics literature
that multinational ﬁrms pursue diﬀerent strategies and that this may impact on the eﬀect
of taxes.
In terms of measuring the corporate tax burden, early studies draw on statutory rates.
Though the corresponding data are readily available for a large number of countries, the
rates stipulated in the tax code are not necessarily appropriate when it comes to the
market entry decisions that manifest in the acquisition of a foreign ﬁrm. Rather, the
eﬀective average tax rate (EATR) that measures the net present value of tax payments
as a proportion of the net present value of pre tax capital income taking into account
the capital depreciation and tax allowances, captures the long term implications of FDI
projects (see Devereux and Griﬃths (1998) Devereux et al. (2002), and Buettner and Ruf
(2007)). Related to the EATR is the eﬀective marginal tax rate (EMTR) which measures
the proportionate diﬀerence in post  and pre tax rates of return. This should matter more
for incremental investments in foreign ﬁrms rather than the entry decisions when taking
over control by means of a CBA.
principally horizontal or vertical in nature. This involves testing which variables in determining FDI are
consistent with the theoretical framework (see e.g., Carr et al., 2001; Braconier et al., 2005). But this is
pursued without explicitly identifying the form of investment, horizontal or vertical.
4In the context of the issues highlighted by Desai and Hines (2004) that non proﬁt taxes
matter, the eﬀects may also potentially vary across horizontal and vertical investment
strategies. Of particular note here is that sales taxes may reduce returns from distributing
goods abroad, but this might not be the case with vertical FDI where the sales tax can
be waived when the intermediate product is exported. Therefore, we would expect that a
sales tax has a diﬀerential eﬀect across the alternative strategies, most notably that the
eﬀect is weaker on vertical FDI.
3 International taxation and tax relief
To gauge the degree with which taxation aﬀects FDI decisions, consideration of inter 
national double taxation issues is required. Since the focus of this paper is on CBAs
by US multinationals, the worldwide tax system is relevant where the obligation to pay
domestic taxes arises even when proﬁts were earned abroad. Consideration of the impact
of withholding taxes when proﬁts are repatriated is also required.3
To reduce the double tax burden, the US has signed a large number of bilateral tax treaties
(including with all 18 countries in our sample). The substance of these treaties restricts
the maximum rate of withholding taxes and details the possibilities for double tax relief
in terms of credits US ﬁrms can earn on taxes paid abroad. Denoting the corporate tax
rate in the US and foreign country j by, respectively, τus and τj and the corresponding
withholding rate when repatriating foreign after tax proﬁts (1 − τj) back to the US by
̟j us as well as taking into account tax credits cj, the international total tax rate levied
on a US multinational ﬁrm acquiring a foreign subsidiary is given by
τint = τus + τj + (1 − τj)̟j us − cj  (1)
Since the US applies an indirect tax credit regime, withholding taxes and corporate taxes
are, in principle, both creditable. However, the maximum amount of tax credits is re 
stricted to the tax burden that would accrue to the same income in the US. This is to
avoid negative tax liabilities. Therefore, tax credits depend on whether country j has
relatively higher or lower taxes than the US, that is
cijt =
(
τus if τj + (1 − τj)̟j us − cj ≥ τus
τj + (1 − τj)̟j us if τj + (1 − τj)̟j us − cj < τus 
(2)
(1) and (2) combined determine the relevant corporate tax burden on a US multinational
3For a discussion of these issues see Huzinga and Voget (2009a).
5investing abroad, that is
τint =
(
τj + (1 − τj)̟j us Foreign tax burden higher than US
τus Foreign tax burden lower than US.
(3)
Further to the discussion above, τus and τj can be measured with a statutory rate or an
EATR when confronting (3) with the data.
Under a worldwide tax system, issues of international double taxation arise when foreign
proﬁts are repatriated to the home country. The possibility to defer this decision, and
hence postpone paying withholding taxes ̟j us, modiﬁes the tax burden on FDI. For the
case of the US as parent country, the repatriation of proﬁts can only be deferred when τj
(expressed as statutory rate) is at least 90 percent of τus (Huizinga and Voget, 2009b, p.8).
Therefore, calculating the tax burden on a US multinational deferring the repatriation of





τj Foreign tax burden higher than 90% of US
τus Foreign tax burden less than 90% of US.
(4)
This implies that the US tax rate has to be paid in countries whose taxes are below 90
percent of the corresponding US rate whilst in other cases local taxes (but no withholding
taxes) have to be paid when proﬁts are retained in the foreign country j.
As discussed above, other taxes than those directly levied on corporate proﬁts might
matter for a multinational ﬁrm. To this end, we also consider the role of sales taxes and
labor taxes. Finally, to capture the implications of tax compliance that may vary across
countries, we include a variable that reﬂects the administrative tax burden. This measure
reﬂects the time normally required to comply with taxes in the host country.
Table 1 provides an overview of the tax data. For the year 2005, columns 1 to 3 contain,
respectively, the statutory rate, the eﬀective average and marginal rate of corporate proﬁt
taxes. Detailed data for this is reported by the Institute of Fiscal Studies for 18 countries
up to the year 2005. Columns 4 to 7 report the international tax adjusted rate of (3)
whereby the statutory rate (columns 4 and 5) and the EATR (columns 6 and 7) has
been used. Columns 5 and 7 account for withholding taxes.4 Note that adjusting for
international tax relief reduces the dispersion of the tax burden between countries since,
4The internet appendix to Huizinga and Voget (2009a) contains an international overview of with-
holding tax rates for the year 2004. For the US, we have expanded this to the 1995 to 2005 period
by consulting US double income tax treaties as published by the Inland Revenue Service (IRS) at
www.irs.gov/businesses/international. In accordance with Huizinga and Voget (2009a), we assume that
proﬁts are repatriated as dividend payments.
6under the worldwide tax system, rates cannot be lower than in the US whilst tax credits
mitigate against the double tax burden. Furthermore, the withholding tax rates reported
in column 8 are relatively low. As regards other tax dimensions, the IMF was the source
for the sales tax data of column 9, labor taxes in column 10 are published in the Prices
and Earnings Survey of UBS, and the data on the administrative tax burden in column
11 is taken from Djankov et al. (2010).
Table 1 about here.
4 Determining horizontal and vertical FDI
To investigate the impact of taxation on diﬀerent FDI strategies, we face the challenge
of distinguishing CBAs between horizontally and vertically related ﬁrms. Driven by the
availability of detailed tax data, we focus on US ﬁrms undertaking mergers and acqui 
sitions with foreign targets located in 18 OECD countries (Australia, Austria, Belgium,
Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway,
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom) which were host to almost 9,000
deals during the 1995 2005 period. Reﬂecting the concentration of FDI in the developing
world, these 18 OECD countries accounted for 73 percent of the total number of US ac 
quisitions overseas. The data is sourced from SDC Platinum of Thomson Financial which
claims to record all mergers and acquisitions since 1990.5 In particular, we have extracted
all deals where a US multinational acquired at least a 51 percent stake in the foreign ﬁrm
to reﬂect the ownership aspect of FDI (this includes funding from either within the host
country or the US).
For each deal, SDC Platinum reports standard industry classiﬁcation (SIC) codes of the
US acquirer and foreign target ﬁrm at the 4 digit level denoted here by, respectively,
SICa and SICb. In principle, this should allow one to infer the industrial relationship
between the merging ﬁrms. In particular, when SICa = SICb an acquisition involves
ﬁrms operating in the same industry deﬁned at a suitably disaggregated level, a typical
feature of horizontal integration where multinational ﬁrms replicate the production of
goods and services in several countries.
However, in tying down vertical acquisitions, it is not suﬃcient to observe that the SIC
codes of the acquiring and target ﬁrms diﬀer; one also needs a direct measure of vertical
relatedness that will explicitly identify the potential links within the supply chain, again
determined at a suitably disaggregated level. To address this issue, we draw on the
5SDC data has been used in other studies including Di Giovanni (2005), Herger et al. (2008), and
Hijzen et al. (2008).
7methodology of Fan and Lang (2000) and Fan and Goyal (2006). The essence of this is
to derive measures of vertical relatedness from the input:output structure of commodity
ﬂows between around 500 intermediate industries using US accounts. This methodology
is similar to that applied by Alfaro and Charlton (2009).6 Speciﬁcally, for every pair of
industries, SICa and SICb, the input:output tables report the value of sales that occurs
between them which permits to calculate the dollar value of SICa required to produce a
dollar’s worth of SICb in the US. The higher this measure, denoted as a vertical relatedness
coeﬃcient Vab, the greater the degree with which the corresponding industries are linked
through the supply chain. By deﬁning a benchmark value V , it is then possible to identify
deals between ﬁrms operating in industries with Vab > V that are deemed to be vertically
related. Following Alfaro and Charlton (2009) and Acemoglu et al. (2009), a value of 5
percent and 10 percent is used for V .
One potential issue in matching SIC codes is that ﬁrms often operate in several industries;
the SDC database reports up to 6 diﬀerent SIC codes for both acquiring and target
ﬁrms. Multi business activity arises in particular with multinational ﬁrms, which tend
to be large and already highly diversiﬁed.7 In our sample, acquirers are more diversiﬁed
than targets, with the acquiring ﬁrm reporting, on average, activities in 3.2 industries
(or 4 digit SIC codes) whilst the average target ﬁrm operates only in 1.7 industries.
To reﬂect the prevalence of diversiﬁed multinational ﬁrms, we analyze the horizontal
and vertical relatedness between acquirer and target ﬁrm across every potential pair of
industries in which they operate. In particular, for each CBA, the up to 6 industries
of the acquiring ﬁrm are indexed by r ∈ 1 2 3 4 5 6 and the industries of the target
ﬁrm by s ∈ 1 2 3 4 5 6. There are up to 36 pairs. Whether these are horizontally,
that is SICr
a = SICs
b, or vertically, that is V rs
ab > V , related, gives rise to the following
classiﬁcation of alternative FDI strategies:
(i.) ‘Pure horizontal’ acquisitions between acquiring and target ﬁrms sharing at least
one combination of 4 digit SIC codes, but are vertically unrelated in any of the 36
possible combinations of SICr
a and SICs
b; and
(ii.) ‘Pure vertical’ acquisitions between acquiring and target ﬁrms related in at least one
combination of industries through the supply chain, but have no common industry
codes for across the (up to) 36 combinations of SICr
a and SICs
b codes.
Table 2 formalizes the deﬁnition of the alternative strategies of FDI/CBAs.8
6It is also similar to that applied by Acemoglu et al. (2009) in addressing the factors that determine
vertical integration.
7See, for example, Denis et al. (2002) who, from a sample of more than 44,000 US corporations during
the 1984-1995 period, show that global and industrial diversiﬁcation are highly intertwined.
8In a relatively small number of cases, the classiﬁcation produces less clear outcomes. For example,
8Table 2 about here.
The distribution of the 8,892 US cross border acquisitions between 1995 and 2005 to
18 OECD countries in our data set appears in Table 3. Column 1 shows that the UK,
Canada, and Germany were the main hosts accounting for almost 60 percent of all deals.
Table 3 about here.
Using the methodology reported in Table 2, the alternative investment strategies charac 
terizing these CBAs are reported in columns 2 to 5 of Table 3. Of the total number of
acquisitions, close to 50 percent of all deals are classiﬁed as purely horizontal or vertical.
Using the 5 percent benchmark for V , 17 percent are classiﬁed as ‘pure’ horizontal and
32 percent as ‘pure’ vertical. With the 10 percent benchmark employed (which raises
the threshold in terms of the degree of vertical relatedness between industrial activities),
around 38 percent are classiﬁed as ‘pure’ horizontal and 9 percent as ‘pure’ vertical ac 
quisitions. This observation concurs with the ﬁndings of Alfaro and Charlton (2009)
that, even between developed countries, a considerable proportion of international acqui 
sitions is driven by vertical investment strategies. These classiﬁcations form the basis for
determining the impact of taxes on horizontal and vertical FDI/CBAs.
5 Econometric strategy
5.1 Theoretical background
Since CBAs provide today by far the most common form of FDI, deals—that are hence 
forth indexed by i—between acquirer and target ﬁrms oﬀer a comprehensive source to
study the eﬀect of taxation upon the location decision of multinational ﬁrms. The desire
to integrate a foreign subsidiary rests on the opportunity to generate a discounted future








jt δt δi)  (5)
whose value depends, in turn, on several factors.9 In particular, as discussed at the outset,
ﬁrms are thought to be reluctant to invest in the face of high tax rates τd
jt levied directly
on corporate proﬁts, but also other forms of taxation τo
jt accruing e.g., to the value added
acquisitions involving ﬁrms in the same SIC also pass the measure of vertical relatedness. To avoid
ambiguities, and produce a close concurrence with the theoretical literature on the strategies of the
multinational ﬁrm, the analysis will focus on acquisitions that are ‘purely’ horizontal or vertical according
to the deﬁnition of Table 2.
9See, among others, Devereux and Griﬃth (1998) and Markusen (2002) for similar speciﬁcations to
modeling the proﬁts of multinational ﬁrms.
9component of R (Desai and Hines, 2004) or appearing in the form of an administrative
burden to comply with taxation (Djankov et al., 2010). Further to the discussion of Section
3, when analyzing the location decisions of multinational ﬁrms, the role of international
tax relief needs to be taken into account. Non tax factors that are speciﬁc to a country
and year are summarized in xjt. Year speciﬁc components δt absorb global developments
within the international market for corporate control that drive e.g., the observed wave 
like pattern in international merger activity (see Di Giovanni, 2005). Finally, the speciﬁc
circumstances of a potential deal δi include components such as the deal value and the
expected synergies between the merging companies that have a straightforward eﬀect on
proﬁt opportunities.
5.2 Regression equation and control variables
Our sample with 8,892 CBAs by US multinationals, with target ﬁrms in 18 host coun 
tries during the 1995 to 2005 period, is used to estimate the degree with which taxation
aﬀects the proﬁt opportunities in equation (5) and, in turn, the desire to locate economic
activities abroad. Across deals i, proﬁts are thought to diﬀer systematically between al 
ternative host countries j and years t. Summarizing the tax related variables with τjt and
log linearizing equation (5) yields the regression equation
πijt = e xjtβ + e τjtγ + δt + δi + ǫijt with i = 1     N (6)
j = 1     J
t = 1     T 
where e xjt ≡ ln(xjt), e τjt ≡ ln(τjt), β and γ are coeﬃcients to be estimated, and ǫijt is a
deal speciﬁc error term. The year and time speciﬁc components δt and δi enter equation
(6) in an additive manner.
To isolate the impact of taxes, the set of control variables e xjt accounts for the established
factors to explain FDI including market size, labor and trade cost, exchange rates, and
various indicators relating to the openness of a country to foreign investment and the
extent of regulatory constraints and institutional quality in the host country. In particular,
proﬁt opportunities are expected to be higher in larger markets. This is measured by real
GDP in the host country, which is anticipated to enter with a positive sign. Higher
wage costs are expected to have a negative eﬀect on the decision to locate in any speciﬁc
country. Owing to the separate inclusion of labor taxes, a measure for net wages in the
host country is used. Even with low wages, multinational ﬁrms may be reluctant to
enter foreign markets with strict regulation to hire or layoﬀ workers. This is proxied by
an index on Labor Market Freedom. Variables that represent trade costs are given by
10the distance between the US and the host as well as a variable (Trade Freedom) that
captures the absence of tariﬀ and non tariﬀ barriers to trade in the host country. For the
multinational ﬁrm, this will matter when intermediate goods provide inputs for foreign
subsidiaries or given that exports (subject to trade costs) can be used as an alternative
strategy to establishing a local plant when serving a foreign market.
Other factors which inﬂuence the openness of the country to FDI are given by Investment
Freedom, an index measuring whether the government treats foreign ﬁrms in the same
way as domestic investors, whether speciﬁc industries are closed to investment, whether
governments impose restrictions on capital transactions and transfers—the expected ef 
fect of this variable is positive. Furthermore, the variable Regulatory Burden proxies the
extent of government interventions aﬀecting businesses in the host country—the expected
eﬀect is negative. Corruption is known to act as a potential deterrent to FDI (a point em 
phasized by, among others, Wei (2000)) with the expected eﬀect being negative. Finally,
ﬁnancial factors are also a likely determinant of FDI and foreign acquisitions speciﬁcally.
Following Froot and Stein (1991) and Blonigen (1997), the value of the US dollar is ex 
pected to have a negative eﬀect suggesting that an appreciation of the exchange rate
will likely increase CBAs from the host country. This is measured as the real exchange
rate between the US dollar and the host country currency. Detailed deﬁnitions and data
sources for each of the variables are reported in the data appendix. Table 4 reports the
key summary statistics for the data set.
Table 4 about here.
5.3 Estimation: Conditional logit model or ﬁxed eﬀects Poisson
count regression?
Equation (6) forms the basis for our empirical strategy. However, for several reasons, it
is often problematic to employ proﬁts πijt directly as dependent variable. In particular, a
missing data problem arises since only proﬁts can be observed for countries j that were
actually chosen as host for deal i. Observations for potential alternatives j′ are latent.
Furthermore, even the observed proﬁts represent an accounting value that is subject to
the degree with which undisclosed reserves are created, capital is assumed to depreciate,
or practices of transfer pricing are used to lower the tax burden (compare Desai et al.,
2006). Finally, for more than 50 percent of deals reported in SDC Platinum, the deal
value is not disclosed (Di Giovanni (2005), p.134) making it impossible to establish πijt
for a comprehensive set of CBAs.
To avoid the issues associated with proﬁt data, we follow a growing literature (e.g., De 
vereux and Griﬃth (1998), Buettner and Ruf (2007)) exploiting the fact that observed
11merger deals encapsulate a market entry decision that identiﬁes the country with the





ij′t ∀j′  = j
0 otherwise,
(7)
where j′ denotes alternative hosts where a ﬁrm could, in principle, also have made an
acquisition. Based on the discrete decision hijt, taxes that matter for the multinational
ﬁrm can be connected with the empirically observed market entry (or location) choice.
Econometric models that are capable to handle such choices include the conditional logit
model, where hijt is used directly as dependent variable, and the Poisson count regression,
where observed market entry decisions are aggregated into the number njt =
P
i hijt of
CBA deals with country j during year t. The conditional logit model has mainly been used
for analyzing the distribution and growth of FDI at the sub national (or regional) level.10
Count regression have only recently appeared in the FDI literature in terms of uncovering
the determinants of the number of CBAs between countries (Hijzen et al., 2008; Herger
et al., 2008). Though these econometric approaches have largely been treated separately,
Guimaraes et al. (2003) have shown that they are closely intertwined in the sense of
yielding numerically identical coeﬃcients. This applies also to panel data with ﬁxed
eﬀects estimation; the relevant case here since we observe 18 groups of countries across
11 subsequent years.
Conditional logit models11 exploit the fact that a multinational ﬁrm wants to invest in the
host country oﬀering the highest expected proﬁt opportunity. Following McFadden (1974),
the assumption that the stochastic component ǫijt of (6) is independently and identically
distributed with a type I extreme value distribution implies that the probability that a
ﬁrm acquires a target in country j during year t is given by
Pijt = Pjt =






e xjtβ + e τjtγ
´  (8)
Owing to the exponential nature of (8), the components δi and δt pertaining, respectively,
to individual deals and years drop out. Thus, only variables such as taxes that diﬀer
across alternative host countries j aﬀect the location choice embodied in each merger
and acquisition deal. The joint distribution over all deals i, the 18 diﬀerent host coun 
tries j, and 11 years t under consideration enter the log likelihood function lnLcl =
10Kim et al. (2003), Crozet et al. (2004), and Devereux et al. (2007) are recent examples for this.
11Note that sometimes the generic term multinomial logit model is used for this. Here, we follow
Greene (208, ch. 23.11) and employ the ‘conditional logit model’ for a scenario where the regressors vary






t=1 ln(Pijt). The symmetric treatment of individual acquisition deals implies






















exp(e xjtβ + e τjtγ)
¶¸
  (9)
from which the coeﬃcients β and γ can be estimated. The conditional logit model captures
how taxes may aﬀect the ﬁrm’s decision hijt to invest in a given country, but not the




j=1 njt which is thought to be ﬁxed (see
Schmidheiny and Br  ulhart, 2011, p.215). Rather, the probability (8) determines the
allocation of ﬁrms between host country j during year t, that is
E[njt] = NPjt = N






e xjtβ + e τjtγ
´  (10)
which depends on the taxes of country j, but also on those of the possible alternatives j′.
It is well known that the distributional assumptions of the conditional logit model result
in constant relative probabilities to undertake an acquisition with a given host country
j across all pairs of possible alternatives j′ with odds ratio Pjt Pj′t = exp(e xjtβ + e τjtγ).
Though convenient for estimation, this assumption implies that the decision to invest
in host country j is independent from the composition of the alternatives thought to
be available. To determine whether or not this so called independence from irrelevant
alternatives (IIA) assumption holds empirically, Hausman and McFadden (1984) have
devised a test comparing the diﬀerences of estimated coeﬃcients between an unrestricted
model, denoted by subscripts u, and a restricted model, denoted by subscripts r, eliminat 
ing choices (host countries) from J. Under the null hypothesis that the IIA assumption
holds, these coeﬃcients should not diﬀer signiﬁcantly. With b denoting the estimated
coeﬃcients and V the corresponding variance covariance matrix, the Hausman statistic
HIIA = [br −bu]′[Vr −Vu][br −bu]—which is χ2 distributed with the number of degrees of
freedom equalling the number of explanatory variables—is used to test this hypothesis.
To avoid the caveats of the conditional logit model, the aggregated number njt of deals
with target country j during year t can be used as dependent variable instead of the
location choices hijt. Based on the assumption that the number of cross border acquisi 
tions njt is independently distributed between the 18 possible host countries, basic count
regressions operate with the Poisson distribution, that is






13where the Poisson parameter λjt reﬂects the mean as well as variance of the distribution.
Since event counts cannot adopt negative values, Poisson count regressions employ an
exponential mean transformation to connect the Poisson parameter with the explanatory
variables of (6), that is
E[njt] = λjt = exp(e xjtβ + e τjtγ + δt) = αt exp(e xjtβ + e τjtγ)  (12)
where αt = exp(δt) absorbs the heterogeneity from diﬀerent years and is here treated as
ﬁxed eﬀect.12 Owing to the aggregation of the individual deals into a count njt, which
obeys the stochastic distribution (11), the deal speciﬁc error term no longer appears
in (12). Following Guimaraes et al. (2003), Appendix A.1 demonstrates that the joint


















exp(e xjtβ + e τjtγ)
¶¸
+ C  (13)
Since this diﬀers from (9) only as regards the constant C, the coeﬃcients of a Poisson
count regression with ﬁxed eﬀects αt and a conditional logit model are identical. Note
that this does not apply to the estimation of standard deviations. Therefore, we follow
Guimaraes et al. (2003), and bootstrap the standard deviations.13
5.4 Tax elasticities
The coeﬃcients (β and γ) of the conditional logit model and Poisson count regression are
not informative about the marginal eﬀects of, say, taxes upon the expected number of
acquisitions E[njt]. Therefore, some post estimation is warranted to obtain the direct tax







Even though the coeﬃcient estimates are identical, Schmidheiny and Br  ulhart (2011)
observe that the direct elasticities diﬀer between the Poisson count regression and the
12Instead, αt can also be thought of as introducing additional randomness, which leads to the random
eﬀects Poisson count model. When random eﬀects are assumed to be Gamma distributed, this leads to
a count regression of the Negative Binomial class. As in the case with linear models for panel data, the
Hausman-test Hfe = [bfe−bre]′[Vfe−Vre][bfe−bre] provides the basis to decide whether or not the usage
of ﬁxed eﬀects (fe) or eﬀects (re) is warranted. See Cameron and Trivedi (1998) for a textbook discussion
on panel data count regressions.
13Though the asymptotic standard deviations from the Poisson count and conditional logit model are
lower compared with the bootstrapped values from the data, within the present context, this diﬀerence
is modest and does not aﬀect the conclusions we draw from the results of Section 6.
14conditional logit model. In particular, as derived in Appendix A.2, by using (12) across
host countries j and years t, the Poisson count regression has a constant direct tax elas 
ticity of ηcount
jt = ηcount = γ as long as the estimation occurs with the logarithmically
transformed data e τjt. Using (10), the corresponding direct tax elasticity of the condi 
tional logit model is η
clogit
jt = (1 − Pjt)γ. Note that this (i) varies across alternative host
countries j and years t, (ii) does not exceed ηcount since 0 ≤ Pjt ≤ 1, and (iii) depends on
the taxes set in other host countries j′ since this enters Pjt (see equation (8)). Since the
elasticity pertaining to the conditional logit model changes with the tax rates, which diﬀer







for each host country j.
To see why the tax eﬀect diﬀers between the Poisson count regression and the conditional
logit model, consider the cross elasticity ζjt, that is the percentage change in the number
of acquisitions with foreign country j after a percentage change in taxes τj′t of another







Economically, the cross elasticity reﬂects the degree with which tax decisions in country
j′ exhibit spill over eﬀects towards other host countries. In this regard, count regressions
and conditional logit models represent opposite scenarios. As derived in Appendix A.2,
in count regressions, the constant cross elasticity is ζcount = 0 meaning that spill over
eﬀects are ruled out. Hence, each country can act independently when setting corporate
tax rates for the multinational ﬁrm meaning that the international market for corporate
control is thought to be segmented between hosts j. Schmidheiny and Br  ulhart (2011) call
this a positive sum world in the sense that changes in the number of CBAs in one country
do not come at the expense of other countries. Conversely, the conditional logit model







j Pjt = 1, the additional CBAs with host country j according to η
clogit
jt come
entirely at the expense of competing countries j′. Hence, the conditional logit model
reﬂects a zero sum world (Schmidheiny and Br  ulhart, 2011) where the global number of
CBAs is thought to be ﬁxed.
Table 5 about here.
Table 5 summarizes the diﬀerent implications of the conditional logit model and the
Poisson count regression for the calculation of (direct) tax elasticities. In spite of an
identical coeﬃcient estimate γ, considering alternative models for the location choice of
the multinational ﬁrm gives rise to a more nuanced picture when it comes to reporting tax
elasticities. In particular, the conditional logit model marks a lower bound (in absolute
value) for the direct tax elasticity where tax induced increases of CBAs are diverted from
15competing host countries within an integrated market for corporate control. The direct
elasticity resulting from the Poisson count regression marks an upper bound reﬂecting a
scenario with a market for corporate control that is separated between countries. Under
this scenario, a favorable tax environment creates CBAs rather than diverting them from
competing locations j′.
6 Results
Table 6 reports the results connecting the econometric approaches resting on the foreign
market entry choices of (7) with the empirical FDI/tax literature. In particular, columns 1
and 2 employ statutory rates, columns 3 and 4 eﬀective average rates, and columns 5 and
6 eﬀective marginal rates as measure for direct corporate taxes (all without accounting
for the role of international tax credits). Columns 2, 4, and 6 consider the impact of
foreign corporate tax rates with the inclusion of other taxes levied on sales and wage
payments as well as the administrative burden to conform with the host country tax
system. The results refer to all 8,892 CBAs by US ﬁrms during the 1995 to 2005 period
with the 18 potential host countries. Depending on whether estimation occurred with a
conditional logit model or a count regression, the sample contains 18 × 8 892 = 160 056
or 11 × 18 = 198 observations, respectively. As shown above, the resulting coeﬃcient
estimates are identical and the diﬀerence between the value of the log likelihood function
lnL is due to the constant C appearing in the case of Poisson count regression. Finally,
Hfe reports the Hausman test as regards the panel data Poisson count regression favoring,
aside from the speciﬁcation of column 1, the ﬁxed eﬀects model at every conventional level
of rejection.
Table 6 about here.
Inspection of the results relating to the control variables across the six speciﬁcations of
Table 6 reveals that the coeﬃcients concur with expectations. In particular, economic
size, low labor costs, a cheap foreign currency, the proximity between countries, and
institutional quality (in terms of investment freedom, a low level of corruption, or modest
interventions into labor markets) signiﬁcantly enhance a country’s capacity to attract FDI.
The eﬀect of cumbersome entry regulation is negative but, by and large, insigniﬁcant. In
all speciﬁcations, the eﬀect of trade freedom is insigniﬁcant; this might reﬂect the fact
that the trade barriers between the 18 developed host countries in the sample are already
relatively low.
With respect to taxation, there is broad evidence that direct corporate taxes reduce a
country’s capacity to attract foreign investment (see De Mooij and Ederveen, 2003). This
16is conﬁrmed by the results presented in Table 6, where corporate taxes produce a negative
coeﬃcient when measured by statutory and eﬀective average rates in columns 2 and 4.
Conversely, with eﬀective marginal rates, an insigniﬁcant coeﬃcient arises in columns 5
and 6. As noted above, this is perhaps not surprising since eﬀective marginal tax rates
matter for incremental investments aﬀecting the value of international merger deals rather
than the discrete entry decisions associated with CBAs.14 Finally, other dimensions of
taxation than corporate rates matter for international investment decisions (Desai and
Hines, 2004). For the full sample covering all CBAs, relatively high sales taxes reduce
the probability that a foreign country attracts an acquisition from a US ﬁrm. Likewise,
a burdensome tax bureaucracy, and the associated administrative costs, deters FDI. A
similar eﬀect does not arise with taxes levied on wage payments.
Table 7 extends the analysis of the impact of taxes on foreign market entry decisions by
accounting for international aspects such as tax credits or double taxation arising when
US multinationals earn proﬁts abroad. The direct tax variable of columns 1 and 2 is
deﬁned as in equation (3) of Section 3 where foreign income is assumed to be repatriated
and tax credits can be earned on foreign corporate as well as withholding tax payments.
Recall that τint in (3) can be calculated with statutory or eﬀective average rates.15 The
adjustment of the corporate tax burden with international tax eﬀects uncovers some
striking diﬀerences. Speciﬁcally, though a signiﬁcantly negative entry (at the 10 percent
level) arises again when using statutory tax rates to calculate (3) in column 1, the eﬀect is
insigniﬁcant when using eﬀective average rates in column 2. Columns 3 and 4 consider a
scenario where a US multinational wants to defer the repatriation of foreign proﬁts. The
corresponding international tax burden τ
def
int is calculated as in equation (4) using again
either statutory or eﬀective average rates. In this case, too, the estimated coeﬃcient on
corporate taxes is lower and insigniﬁcant. In sum, to the degree with which CBAs reﬂect
long term market entry decisions and, hence, the EATR provides the appropriate measure
and/or the repatriation of foreign proﬁts can be referred, accounting for international
eﬀects appears to reduce the importance of corporate taxes as determinant of choosing a
country as host when US ﬁrms take over a foreign subsidiary.
Table 7 about here.
To check the robustness of the result that tax credits mitigate against the eﬀect of direct
corporate taxation when US multinationals invest abroad, we have re estimated the co 
14We have also estimated a regression with the value of all CBAs by US ﬁrms with country j during
year t as dependent variable. In this case, eﬀective marginal eﬀects yield a signiﬁcantly negative entry.
However, due to the caveats of using value data discussed in Section 5.3, we will rely on discrete entry
decisions hijt and international merger counts njt when calculating the further results.
15Since eﬀective marginal tax rates are unimportant for entry decisions, a corresponding international
tax adjusted measure has not been calculated.
17eﬃcients of Tables 6 and 7 using several alternative speciﬁcations. In particular, we have
included the lagged number of CBAs as additional explanatory variable to account for
the possibility of correlation across years. Furthermore, an alternative to calculating the
tax rates accounting for international tax relief would be the double tax burden, e.g., the
taxes a multinational ﬁrm pays in excess of the US rate (compare Huizinga and Voget,
2009a). To obtain this, the US tax rate τus would have to be subtracted from (3) and (4).
No substantive diﬀerences in the results arise with these modiﬁcations with the tax credit
adjusted corporate taxation measure (using the eﬀective average rates) continuing to be
statistically insigniﬁcant.16 For the sake of brevity, the results of the robustness checks
are not reported here, but are available on request.
Following the procedure outlined in Section 4, Table 8 reports the results that relate to
the distinction between the horizontal and vertical strategies for FDI using a 5 bench 
mark for V to identify deals that are deemed vertically related. Recall that the sample
contains only deals where a ‘purely’ horizontal or vertical relationship between acquiring
and target ﬁrms could be identiﬁed. Following the discussion above, the results have
been calculated with statutory and eﬀective average corporate tax rates and making the
distinction between cases (i) only with foreign corporate taxes, (ii) accounting for the role
of tax credits and withholding taxes (compare (3)), and (iii) the international tax burden
when the repatriation of foreign proﬁts can be deferred (compare (4)). Compared with the
baseline results, the distinction between horizontal and vertical acquisition strategies does
not give rise to large diﬀerences as regards the signiﬁcance of the control variables. An
exception to this is the insigniﬁcant entry of net wages in all speciﬁcation with horizontal
acquisitions whilst one signiﬁcant eﬀect arises with vertical acquisitions. This is perhaps
not surprising since horizontal FDI is thought to be market access seeking rather than
driven by the desire to outsource production stages underlying vertical FDI, where labor
cost considerations may be more relevant. Furthermore, variables such as the freedom
to undertake FDI and the burden of regulation seem to matter more when multinational
ﬁrms pursue a vertical strategy. Again, this is not surprising when outsourcing involves
mainly lower wage countries where institutional quality of institutions tends to be lower
as well.
Table 8 about here.
The eﬀect of direct corporate taxes in Table 8 is consistent with the ﬁndings above in
the sense that credits on foreign tax payments and deferrals reduce the eﬀect of taxes
16To absorb diﬀerences between host countries, we have also calculated speciﬁcations with country-
speciﬁc eﬀects. However, the inclusion of 11 year and 18 country-speciﬁc variables reduces the hetero-
geneity remaining for estimating coeﬃcients that, indeed, turn out to be almost always insigniﬁcant in
this case.
18towards statistical insigniﬁcance. Likewise, there are no qualitative diﬀerences as regards
the signiﬁcant deterrent of a cumbersome tax bureaucracy and labor taxes. However, the
most notable diﬀerence across the horizontal and vertical motivations is that sales taxes
do have a negative impact on horizontal acquisitions while the corresponding coeﬃcient
is much lower, and insigniﬁcant for vertical acquisitions. This is intuitive since exported
goods are often exempted from local sales taxes and the primary rationale for vertical
integration relates exactly to the production of intermediate inputs to downstream stages
of the supply chain located in other countries. Conversely, with horizontal acquisitions,
multinational ﬁrms integrate a foreign plant to produce and sell goods locally such that
the sales tax should matter. Note that the distinction of the impact of taxes is robust to
using a 1 and a 10 percent benchmark for V . Again, for the sake of brevity, we do not
report these results here but are available on request.
In sum, our results suggest that: (i) not accounting for double taxation issues, proﬁt
taxes in the host country reduces FDI with the impact of the EATR being lower than the
statutory rate; (ii) accounting for international eﬀects implies that the direct corporate
tax rate in the host country is maybe less important for the decision of US ﬁrms to acquire
overseas targets than previous research suggests; (iii) sales taxes matter mainly for CBAs
where multinational ﬁrms pursue a horizontal strategy and, thus, aim to sell locally whilst
for vertical investment strategies, whose re exports are exempted from the correspond 
ing tax payments, the detrimental eﬀect is insigniﬁcant; and (iv) the administrative tax
burden is always a signiﬁcant impediment to FDI.
To address whether the critical assumption of independence from irrelevant alternatives
(IIA) holds (discussed in Section 5), we apply the above mentioned test of Hausman and
McFadden (1984) to the conditional logit model. The subsequent elimination of the 18
possible host countries across the speciﬁcations of Tables 6 to 8 never yields a value of
the Hausman test statistics HIIA above 2. Against a critical value of 22.36 from a χ2
distribution with 13 degrees of freedom (e.g., the number of regressors), this is far from
signiﬁcant. We have also used tests where we drop up to 5 host countries17 from the choice
set J. Even then, we could never reject the IIA assumption. For the sake of brevity, these
results are not reported here, but are available on request.
Tax elasticities estimates can diﬀer between countries and depend, furthermore, on the
econometric framework (conditional logit or Poisson count model), the tax measure used
(statutory or eﬀective average rate), and the investment strategy (horizontal or vertical) a
multinational ﬁrm is thought to pursue. Taken together, this means that a range of values
17Limdep, with which the results have been calculated, allows to drop up to 5 alternatives from the
choice set J.
19can be attached to the tax elasticity on, say, the eﬀect of direct corporate taxes reﬂecting
the underlying uncertainties of the appropriate econometric strategy and measurement
of taxation. Against this background, across host countries, Figures 1 and 2 show the
ranges of elasticities that are compatible with the coeﬃcients estimated above. Thereby,
the bounds reported for each country refer to the minimum and maximum tax elasticity
(in absolute value) associated with the conditional logit model and the Poisson count
regression, respectively (compare Table 5).
Figure 1 focuses on the role of international tax relief and tax deferrals whereby the elas 
ticities of corporate taxes measured by statutory rates appear in the top panel. Though
all resulting values lie between 0 and  1, there is dispersion depending on whether only the
foreign corporate tax rate is used (this relates to the coeﬃcients of column 2 of Table 6),
tax credits and withholding taxes are taken into account (this relates to the coeﬃcients
of column 1 of Table 7), or a case with deferred proﬁt repatriation is considered (this
relates to the coeﬃcients of column 3 of Table 7). Furthermore, the dispersion appears
to increase with the size of the country and is highest for the UK, Canada, Germany,
and France. This is perhaps not surprising since these economically large countries also
attract a substantial fraction of US acquisition deals (since Pjt is relatively high) entailing
considerable spill over eﬀects in case other countries change their tax rates, which reduces
the tax elasticity (see Table 5). The bottom panel of Figure 1 uses the EATR. Regardless
whether a case with only foreign tax rates (see column 4 of Table 6), international tax
eﬀects (see column 2 of Table 7), or deferrals in repatriating proﬁts (see column 4 of Table
7) is considered, the value of the direct tax elasticity is relatively stable and lies between
 0.4 to  0.6.
Figure 1 about here.
The range of direct tax elasticities reported in Figure 1 is both low and narrow compared
with what has been found in previous studies (see De Mooij and Ederveen, 2003). The
broader data coverage as well as the fact that our estimates refer to the eﬀect of taxation
on market entry decisions, rather than the amount to be invested in an FDI project,
provide possible explanations for this.18
Figure 2 compares the tax elasticities between horizontal and vertical CBAs. In particular,
the top and middle panel show the range of elasticities for corporate taxes measured in
terms of statutory and eﬀective average tax rates whereby no systematic pattern between
horizontal or vertical seems emerge. However, the range and value of tax elasticities
18The reason for ﬁnding low elasticities is neither the data source nor the sample of host countries we
use. Using the deal values of CBAs referred to in footnote 14 yields indeed much higher values for the
direct tax elasticities. Recall again the caveats of these value data as discussed in Section 5.3.
20is again lower when using the EATR. Finally, the bottom panel displays the sales tax
elasticities whereby the values for the full sample are based on the coeﬃcients of column
4 of Table 7.19 Across the diﬀerent host countries and estimation methods, the range of
tax elasticities is relatively low and lies between  0.1 and  0.15. Insofar as sales taxes are
levied on local transactions that are relatively immobile, this result is seems intuitive.
Recalling the diﬀerential eﬀect of sales taxes between horizontal and vertical deals, the
other ranges refer to the sales tax elasticities calculated from, respectively, column 6 and
12 of Table 8. Whilst for horizontal deals the results are comparable to the full sample, for
vertical deals the value of the tax elasticity is close to zero (and the underlying coeﬃcient is
insigniﬁcant) reﬂecting the idea that sales taxes are maybe unimportant when subsidiaries
are mainly set up for exporting intermediate and ﬁnal goods.
Figure 2 about here.
7 Concluding remarks
Attracting FDI is an important goal for policy makers, with the use of taxes seen as
being one of the primary instruments to achieve this. Previous research has emphasized
the role of modest direct corporate taxes to increase a country’s appeal as host for FDI
and suggested that the corresponding eﬀect is potentially high.
By analyzing the decisions of US multinational ﬁrms to invest in speciﬁc host countries
as embodied in cross border acquisition deals—the most prominent form of FDI—this
paper suggests that the eﬀects of taxation are less clear cut. First, countries such as the
US have concluded a large number of bilateral tax treaties that almost always permit a
multinational ﬁrm to deduct a fraction of, or even all, direct corporate and withholding
taxes paid abroad. International tax relief tends to adjust the level of direct corporate
taxation. Our results show indeed that after accounting for the deductions stipulated in
such treaties, the eﬀect of direct corporate taxation in a foreign host country is always
insigniﬁcant. Furthermore, the tax burden on the multinational ﬁrm is not restricted
to direct taxation. We indeed ﬁnd that sales taxes provide a signiﬁcant deterrent for
FDI. Then, again, the issue of relief from sales taxes matters. This eﬀect is most clear
when we account for diﬀerences in investment strategies, since horizontal FDI is thought
to be market access seeking and involves the local sale of goods whereas vertical FDI is
thought to be endowment seeking and often involves an export of locally produced goods.
These are typically exempted from the local sales tax that should, therefore, be irrelevant
19Observe that the coeﬃcient estimates on sales taxes are strikingly similar between the results of
Tables 6 to 8 with signiﬁcant coeﬃcients (e.g., the top value of tax elasticities according to the Poisson
count regression) falling in the range between -0.1 and -0.2.
21for international investment decisions by the vertically integrated multinational ﬁrm. By
comparing whether the US acquirer and foreign target ﬁrm share the same industry and
are vertically related (in terms of substantial value ﬂows between these industries), we have
identiﬁed purely horizontal and vertical cross border acquisitions. Making this distinction
leads indeed to a signiﬁcant entry of the sales tax for horizontal, but not for vertical deals.
Finally, the eﬃciency of public authorities in collecting taxes appears to be an important
locational advantage for some countries and an important deterrent for FDI in others.
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25A Derivations
A.1 Log-Likelihood of Fixed Eﬀects Poisson Count Regression
There are several ways to derive the ﬁxed eﬀects estimator for Poisson count regressions
(Cameroon and Trivedi, 1998, ch. 9.3). Following Guimaraes et al. (2003), we use a
maximum likelihood approach estimating the coeﬃcients (β τ) simultaneously with the
ﬁxed eﬀects αt. Using (11) to calculate the likelihood function over 18 host countries j
and 11 years t yields













which upon substituting (12) gives



























e xjtβ + e τjtγ
´  (A.1.3)
Substituting (A.1.3) into (A.1.2) to eliminate the ﬁxed eﬀect αt gives equation (13) in the








j=1 njt! (and constant with respect to β and τ).
26A.2 Tax elasticities












exp(e xjtβ + e τjtγ)
= γ  (A.2.1)
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e xjtβ + e τjtγ
´
N exp(e xjtβ + e τjtγ)
 
which upon canceling terms reduces to
η
clogit
jt = γ −






e xjtβ + e τjtγ
´
| {z }
=Pjt according to (8)
γ = (1 − Pjt)γ  (A.2.4)
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e xjtβ + τjtγ
´
N exp(e xjtβ + e τjtγ)
 










e xjtβ + e τjtγ
´
| {z }
=Pjt according to (8)
γ = −Pjtγ  (A.2.7)
27B Data Appendix
28Description of the Data Set
Variable Unit Description Source
Dependent Variables:
hijt Nominal For each US cross border acquisition (CBA) be-
tween 1995 and 2005, this indicates whether
country j has been chosen as host, in which
case hijt = 1, or another country has been cho-
sen as host, in which case hijt = 0. 18 countries
(Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Finland,
France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan,
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden,




njt Count Number of CBAs between the US and host






Percent Statutory tax rate on corporate proﬁts in coun-
try j. For countries using diﬀerent taxes, the
manufacturing rate is chosen. Local taxes are







Percent Eﬀective average tax rate (EATR) on corporate
proﬁts in country j. This is the proportion of
proﬁt from an investment in plant in machinery







Percent Eﬀective marginal tax rate (EMTR) on corpo-
rate proﬁts in country j. This is calculated by
the diﬀerence between the pre-tax and post-tax






Percent This is the tax rate on a multinational ﬁrm ac-
counting for tax credits as stipulated in double
income tax treaties as well as withholding taxes
when proﬁts are repatriated to the US (in form
of dividends). We use statutory or eﬀective av-









Percent This is the tax rate on a multinational ﬁrm
when the repatriation of foreign proﬁts is de-
ferred. We use statutory or eﬀective average









Labor Tax Percent Compulsory social security and income tax con-
tributions in percent of gross salaries. Data are
published on a tri-annual basis. Values of the








Time that companies need on average to com-
ply with tax regulations (prepare, ﬁle, and pay




Corruption Index Corruption index on a scale from 10 to 90. Orig-
inal values have been reversed such that higher
values mean more corruption. For 1995, the val-
ues for Belgium, Finland, Netherlands and Nor-





Great circular distance between Washington DC








Index Index of freedom of investment reﬂecting e.g.,
whether foreign ﬁrms are treated the same as do-
mestic ﬁrms, whether the government imposes
restrictions on payments or capital transactions,
or whether speciﬁc industries are closed to for-
eign investment. For 1995, the values for Bel-
gium, Finland, Netherlands and Norway are not





Index Index of labor market freedom on a scale from
10 to 90 measuring dimensions such as mini-
mum wages, regulation against layoﬀs, regula-
tory burden on hirings etc. This data is only
available from 2005. For other years, the value






Net wage in the host country. Wages are mea-
sured by an index referring to the hourly in-
come of 13 comparable professions (product
managers, department heads, engineers, pri-
mary school teachers, bus drivers, car mechan-
ics, building laborers, industrial workers, cooks,
bank credit oﬃcers, personal assistants, sales as-
sistants, factory workers) as paid in the capital
city or the ﬁnancial center of a country. Data
are published on a tri-annual basis. Values of






Real gross domestic product in US$ with base





Index Regulatory Burden measures the ability to start,
operate, and close a business that represents the
overall burden of regulation. For 1995, the val-
ues for Belgium, Finland, Netherlands and Nor-
way are not available and the 1996 value is used
instead. The original values have been reversed





Index This measures tariﬀ and non-tariﬀ barriers on
a scale from 10 to 90. For 1995, the values for
Belgium, Finland, Netherlands and Norway are






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































32Table 2: Deﬁnition of Horizontal and Vertical Cross Border Acquisitions
FDI Strategy Horizontal Relatedness Vertical Relatedness
Pure Horizontal ∃r s s.t, SICr
a = SICs
b V rs
ab < V ∀r s
Pure Vertical SICr
a  = SICs
b ∀r s ∃r s s.t V rs
ab > V









(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Australia 543 124 227 174 50
Austria 59 21 33 13 2
Belgium 151 24 60 46 12
Canada 1974 345 751 553 142
Finland 83 15 35 42 8
France 779 130 279 240 70
Germany 1158 180 396 354 105
Greece 12 2 4 3 2
Ireland 131 17 46 52 14
Italy 306 46 97 83 21
Japan 219 25 58 74 22
Netherlands 341 50 129 118 37
Norway 100 30 40 28 12
Portugal 26 7 13 5 3
Spain 206 51 78 52 20
Sweden 217 31 86 72 20
Switzerland 188 24 63 69 23
UK 2399 430 949 782 210























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































34Table 5: Coeﬃcients and Tax Elasticities

















T ηcount = γ
Economic
Context
  Lower bound for direct tax elas 
ticity
  Cross elasticity  = 0
  Integrated CBA market
  CBA diversion
  Upper bound for direct tax
elasticity
  Cross elasticity = 0
  Segmented CBA market
  CBA creation/distruction
35Table 6: Results for Statutory and Eﬀective Tax Rates
Corporate Tax: Statutory Rate Eﬀective Average Rate Eﬀective Marginal Rate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Market Size 0.94*** 0.95*** 0.86*** 0.91*** 0.81*** 0.84***
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04)
Net Wage  0.13  0.37*  0.08  0.42*  0.03  0.42*
(0.17) (0.21) (0.18) (0.22) (0.18) (0.23)
Labor Market 1.80*** 1.07*** 1.93*** 1.05*** 1.93*** 1.03***
Freedom (0.25) (0.30) (0.27) (0.32) (0.26) (0.32)
Distance  0.48***  0.45***  0.46***  0.46***  0.43***  0.45***
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
FDI Freedom 0.82*** 0.73*** 0.96*** 0.91*** 0.99*** 0.98***
(0.29) (0.29) (0.29) (0.27) (0.29) (0.27)
Regulatory Burden  0.39  0.16 0.07  0.35  0.21  0.57*
(0.29) (0.33) (0.28) (0.31) (0.27) (0.30)
Trade Freedom 0.18 0.24 0.13 0.15 0.14 0.12
(0.70) (0.71) (0.72) (0.73) (0.69) (0.70)
Corruption  1.93***  1.36***  1.86***  1.36***  1.54***  1.19***
(0.35) (0.36) (0.37) (0.39) (0.41) (0.43)
Exchange Rate  0.37***  0.33***  0.37***  0.31***  0.39***  0.30***
(0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Corporate Tax  0.74***  0.74***  0.31  0.47** 0.11  0.06
(0.21) (0.22) (0.23) (0.21) (0.12) (0.11)
Sales Tax  0.14***  0.14***  0.11**
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Labor Tax 0.24 0.08  0.06
(0.25) (0.23) (0.22)
Administrative  0.41***  0.49***  0.54***
Tax Burden (0.11) (0.10) (0.10)
#cba 8,892 8,892 8,892 8,892 8,892 8,892
#obscl 160,056 160,056 160,056 160,056 160,056 160,056
#obspc 198 198 198 198 198 198
lnLcl  20,039  19,897  20,074  19,918  20,078  19,932
lnLpc  1,010  867.5  1,045  888.8  1,049  903.5
Hfe 12.6 152.9 97.6 98.7 1,505 110.5
Notes: Estimation is by maximum likelihood. A conditional logit model with dependent
variable hijt and a Poisson count regression with dependent variable njt and year speciﬁc
eﬀect αt yield identical coeﬃcients. The data cover CBAs by US ﬁrms between 1995 and 2005
with 18 host countries. Furthermore, #cba is the total number of deals, #obs is the number
of observations, and lnL the value of the log likelihood function (for the conditional logit (cl)
and Poisson count regression (pc)). Hfe is the Hausman test statistic between the random
and ﬁxed eﬀects Poisson count regression. Standard errors reported in parantheses have
been bootstrapped with 1’000 replications and 1’000 random draws of hijt. * Coeﬃcients
are signiﬁcant at the 10% level; ** Signiﬁcant at the 5% level; *** Signiﬁcant at the 1%
level.
36Table 7: Results accounting for International Taxation
Corporate Tax Rate: Statutory EATR Statutory EATR
Tax Deferral: no no yes yes
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Market Size 0.88*** 0.87*** 0.86*** 0.87***
(0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05)
Net Wage  0.36  0.43*  0.37  0.41*
(0.24) (0.23) (0.23) (0.23)
Labor Market Freedom 0.83*** 0.85** 0.95*** 0.88***
(0.35) (0.36) (0.31) (0.33)
Distance  0.42***  0.46***  0.42***  0.46***
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
FDI Freedom 0.89*** 0.99*** 0.96*** 1.05***
(0.27) (0.27) (0.27) (0.28)
Regulatory Burden  0.55*  0.54*  0.56*  0.56*
(0.30) (0.30) (0.31) (0.31)
Trade Freedom 0.31 0.17 0.25 0.21
(0.72) (0.70) (0.71) (0.71)
Corruption  1.21***  1.20***  1.19***  1.26***
(0.39) (0.39) (0.38) (0.39)
Exchange Rate  0.31***  0.29***  0.30***  0.29***
(0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05)
Corporate Tax  0.86*  0.53  0.57  0.52
(0.49) (0.48) (0.43) (0.39)
Sales Tax  0.14***  0.16***  0.10***  0.12**
(0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05)
Labor Tax 0.08  0.01 0.01 0.04
(0.23) (0.22) (0.22) (0.22)
Admin. Tax Burden  0.52***  0.55***  0.53***  0.56***
(0.11) (0.10) (0.11) (0.11)
#cba 8,892 8,892 8,892 8,892
#obscl 160,056 160,056 160,056 160,056
#obspc 198 198 198 198
lnLcl  19,905  19,928  19,926  19,927
lnLpc  891.9  898.8  897.4  898.0
Hfe 81.6 77.9 54.1 73.1
Notes: Estimation is by maximum likelihood. A conditional logit model with de 
pendent variable hijt and a Poisson count regression with dependent variable njt
and year speciﬁc eﬀect αt yield identical coeﬃcients. The data cover CBAs by US
ﬁrms between 1995 and 2005 with 18 host countries. Furthermore, #cba is the total
number of deals, #obs is the number of observations, and lnL the value of the log
likelihood function (for the conditional logit (cl) and Poisson count regression (pc)).
Hfe is the Hausman test statistic between the random and ﬁxed eﬀects Poisson
count regression. Standard errors reported in parantheses have been bootstrapped
with 1’000 replications and 1’000 random draws of hijt. * Coeﬃcients are signiﬁcant
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:￿￿￿ $&￿).￿ $)￿￿.￿ ,2￿￿￿ ,.￿2￿ $)+)￿ $&￿￿'￿













￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿  ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ !￿￿￿￿  ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ !￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿5￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
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456￿4￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ +￿.,---￿ +￿,,---￿ +￿,￿---￿ $￿+)---￿
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3￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ +￿+.￿ 1+￿+$￿ +￿+$￿ +￿+(￿
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￿￿￿￿￿ !￿￿￿￿
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